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The writer is a defence and security expert. Email him at: rwjanj@hotmail.com
For Pakistan, the 1971 War was an unequal contest in the face of heavy odds, missed opportunities and unrealised objectives. Faced with a full-blown insurgency in East Pakistan, the beleaguered Pakistan Army braved the attacks of the Mukti Bahni insurgents, actively supported by Indian army from secure bases inside West Bengal. Indian government led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was keen to seize the historic opportunity to dismember Pakistan which was offered to her by the political tumult and associated insurgency in East Pakistan.
If India had not militarily intervened, Pakistani political forces could have resolved their differences. But despite being heavily outnumbered and confronted with impossible operational and tactical odds, the Pakistani troops fought valiantly, displaying prodigies of valour which were duly acknowledged by no less than Indian Army Chief.
Due to a dithering and vacillating Pakistani leadership, the UN-brokered ceasefire did not become a possibility, leaving outnumbered and depleted Pakistani troops in East Pakistan. We owe our future generations a true explanation of the events, warts and all, so that the miasma of negativity shrouding every aspect of the 1971 tragedy is cleared and shows a balanced picture of the political and military reality. Despite a number of mistakes at political and military level, there were shining examples of courage and determination which, if supported by deft politics, could have averted the Indian designs of Pakistan’s dismemberment.
A synopsis of war at tactical, operational and strategic level is necessary to understand why 1971 was an unequal contest. At politico-strategic level, Pakistan’s political leadership in the West failed to accommodate the aspirations of the Eastern Wing, especially after the elections that were conducted on the basis of adult suffrage after dissolution of the One Unit Scheme. Sheikh Mujib’s six points were virtually a blueprint for separation and General Yahya, being a novice in politics, failed to negotiate desired concessions and constitutional safeguards before conceding on dissolution of One Unit parity principle.
Even seasoned politicians like Abdul Wali Khan, Mufti Mehmud, Mumtaz Daultana, Sardar Shaukat Hayat and Ghaus Bizenjo failed to convince Sheikh Mujib to make realistic concessions to preserve the country’s unity. When a befuddled Yahya Khan asked them, “What should I do now?” they said,” You are the President, do your duty.”
At military strategic level, no meaningful addition of resources to achieve the desired strategic ends of defending the East Pakistan territory was made, ceding a 1:15 numerical advantage to the Indian Army which, according to an American diplomat Archer K Blood, helped Indians use their soil as the seat of the Bangladesh Government in Exile. At an operational level, the correlation of forces in Western theatre was 1:2.5 but still, Pakistan Army had planned a major offensive in the West – initiated through tactical attacks against Poonch, Chamb, Fazilka and Ramgarh, followed by a major armoured thrust through an armoured division and two infantry divisions against Ganganagar.
In East, Pakistan faced an active insurgency and the fears of losing territory that could have handed Mukti Bahni a propaganda victory, the two ad hoc and three depleted regular infantry divisions were thinly deployed, covering maximum frontage with only one lightly armed regiment, depleted artillery and only one fighter jet squadron. On 2 Dec, India ordered its forces to cross the border into East Pakistan to formalise their aggression that had commenced in the shape of insurgency abetment since March 71. At 6 pm on 3 Dec, Pakistan Air Force attacked nine Indian air bases while General Yahya announced war with India in a televised address.
Due to lack of operational synergy, the Pakistani aerial attacks and the ground offensives in the West could make little impact. In 12 Division area, in Kashmir, two brigades i.e. 7 AK and 26 Brigade were employed to capture Poonch but could not attain the objective due to several factors including less troops to task ratio and poorly coordinated artillery support. The creation of tactical reserves over a 400 km frontage opened defence gaps, leading to losses in Lipa and Kazinag.
In 23 Division area, the courageous leadership of debonair Major General Iftikhar Janjua resulted in capture of Chamb. Pakistani plan to go for deep objectives bypassing Indian 191 Infantry Brigade employing 66 brigade, 11 Cavalry group, 2 Armoured Brigade and 111 Brigade was a classic bold operation and the Indians lay completely vulnerable from 4th to 5th December. By a little luck and more resolve, Pakistan might have reached the sensitive objectives envisaged by the indomitable General Janjua in his original plan. This offensive rattled Indians fixing their two divisions i.e. 10 and 26 Division, which could have been used for an offensive in Sialkot Sector.
There were two main Indian thrusts, the northern advance of 54 Div aiming to cut the road between Shakargarh and Sialkot, east of Zafarwal, and that of 36 Div due east directed at Shakargarh with the intention of exploiting the GT Road. The area was heavily mined and the defenders dogged. Indian 1 Corps only advanced 13 kms in 12 days and failed to capture even its initial objectives. In Lahore, Pakistan captured Qaiser e Hind in Kasur Sector, while in Sulemanki, Pakistan captured an enclave across Sutlej but had to come back from Fazilka.
Pakistan’s offensive by 18 Division in desert sector to gain Jaisalmer, Ramgarh and Longanewala did not succeed due to lack of air cover while the main armour offensive against Ganganagar by 1 armoured division was not launched at all. PAF mounted attacks on airfields at Amritsar, Avantipur, Faridkot, Pathankot and Srinagar. This offensive, undertaken with too few aircrafts, failed to interfere markedly with IAF capability. The Indian Navy sank the submarine PNS Ghazi off Vishakapatnam in the Bay of Bengal. A Pakistani submarine sank the Indian frigate INS Khukri, but Indians managed to establish effective naval blockade in East Pakistan.
Due to an operational stalemate on Western sector, the strategic impact desired in the operations in Eastern front was minimal. Outnumbered and insurgency entangled, Pakistani forces in Eastern Sector kept fighting valiantly with units like 31 Baloch, eliciting paeans of praise by Indians in the famous Battle of Jamalpur. The troops would have fought on gallantly had the political and strategic factors been favourable.
In the end these words of Field Marshal Manek Shaw capture the essence of war in the Eastern theatre, “The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan fought very gallantly but they had no chance: they were a thousand miles away from their base and I had a superiority of almost 1:15”.
