ISLAMABAD: Back in October 2011, when the Memogate scandal erupted and tensions escalated between Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the then president Asif Ali Zardari, under immense mental stress, attempted to fly to Dubai for medical treatment, armed with a loaded gun.
His departure was aborted, as revealed by Farhatullah Babar in his book, The Zardari Presidency (2008–13).
Zardari’s health was deteriorating rapidly. His personal physician, Dr Asim Hussain, who was in Azerbaijan at the time, was urgently summoned. The president required immediate medical attention, including a brain MRI. He refused to be examined at the army hospital, leaving two options: Karachi or Dubai. After a private meeting with his son, Bilawal, Zardari left the decision to him. Bilawal opted for treatment in Dubai. However, doctors strongly advised against air travel due to Zardari’s condition. Dr Asim insisted that the President should only be moved to his private hospital in Karachi, nowhere else.
As preparations for the Dubai trip were underway, another complication arose. Zardari was adamant on not leaving behind Ambassador Husain Haqqani, fearing that Haqqani would be vulnerable to military retribution and potentially become an approver in the scandal. Zardari believed he was the primary target of the memo controversy, not Haqqani.
Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani cautioned that if Haqqani left the country, media headlines would scream, “Zardari, Haqqani flee the country,” provoking strong reactions from the judiciary, political parties and the military. “If Haqqani left the country, the government would not survive for a day,” he warned, as noted by Babar. Gilani also opposed conducting Zardari’s medical tests in Pakistan, fearing that the results could be used in the media and courts to disqualify him on health grounds. Nonetheless, persuading Zardari to travel without Haqqani remained a challenge, especially since Haqqani’s name was on the Exit Control List (ECL) by order of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. “Someone even suggested sedating the president and escorting him to the helicopter without Haqqani,” Babar writes, but the idea was not seriously considered.
The helicopter’s departure was delayed for hours as Zardari refused to leave without Haqqani. Prime Minister Gilani assured Zardari that Haqqani would be kept safe at the Prime Minister’s House, but Zardari remained resolute. When Zardari and Haqqani finally boarded the helicopter, the pilot cited delays due to pending landing permission from Dubai. An aide informed the president that Dubai had not granted landing rights and that the plan was to divert to Karachi instead. Zardari refused, insisting, “I will wait for 30 hours for the permission, but I’m not going to Karachi.”
Babar later discovered that the real issue was not Dubai’s permission. Malik Riaz informed Babar that a senior intelligence officer had conveyed that any aircraft with Haqqani on board would not be allowed to leave Pakistani airspace. To prevent the aircraft from being intercepted and forced to return, Rehman Malik canceled the previous instructions for the special plane to land in Dubai.
Meanwhile, Dr Asim refused to board the helicopter, expressing concern over Zardari’s agitation and the fact that he was armed. He feared that if the plane landed in Karachi instead of Dubai, Zardari might react unpredictably – shooting randomly inside the plane.
As Zardari remained steadfast in his decision, Prime Minister Gilani, accompanied by Bilawal, went to the helipad. While the exact words exchanged remain unclear, Gilani successfully persuaded Zardari to return to the Presidency. Later, he confided to close associates that he told the president: “Since Dubai hasn’t given permission to land, you have to return to the house. You’re not going to Karachi. Haqqani will go with you wherever you go, but now you’re not going anywhere, so let’s go back.”
