.
The writer is an Assistant Manager Research at NUST Institute of Policy Studies (NIPS)
The recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan are not isolated security incidents. They represent a more profound change in the character and scope of violence that the state has been facing. Suicide bombings against religious groups and state institutions indicate that Pakistan is no longer experiencing a single terrorist threat but a complex interplay of ideological militancy, ethnic insurgency and sectarian conflict. This changing environment demonstrates the weaknesses of a security-based counterterrorism approach, which is largely remedial in nature and stems from an inability to cater to the evolving realities of identity politics, governance issues and regional geopolitical realities.
As of recent, Pakistan’s capital of city has witnessed two major terrorist incidents: a suicide blast in the Judicial Complex in the G-11 sector, leaving 12 martyred and 35 injured; and another one in an Imambargah in Tarlai area, resulting in the martyrdom of 30 and injuries to over 150. Both attacks, apart from the colossal devastation and human loss, have two significant parallels. One, location-wise, the attacks in the federal capital prompt questions over the intelligence and security measures of the country. Two, the timing stands out as the first attack happened during the Sri Lanka cricket team visit, while the second after the conclusion of the Operation Raddul-Fitna-1 in Balochistan and the two-day visit of the Uzbek president.
Pakistan continues to face huge losses to its human, national and regional aspirations of peace, prosperity and growth since its support in the USA’s global war on terror. Presently, it faces a rather evolved version of terrorism: a multifaceted, misguided and misinterpreted militancy in the name of religion. Cases in point are the above-mentioned attacks in Islamabad by TTP-linked Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Islamic State. The other two major strands of terrorism facing the country include the rapidly intensifying ethnonationalist and separatist violence in Balochistan, generally driven by marginalisation and grievances over autonomy and resources, and the sporadic sectarian attacks on the Shia sect. Hence, Pakistan’s terrorism landscape is predominantly driven by TTP/ISKP’s agendas, Baloch ethno-nationalist separatism and sectarian violence, with cross-border militancy and political instability as other intervening factors.
Pakistan’s experience demonstrates that terrorism changes shape and adapts with time. For instance, in the 1990s, sectarian violence dominated Pakistan’s security landscape until the misguided religious insurgency became the principal threat following 9/11, and an intensified ethno-nationalist violence in Balochistan since the last decade. Hence, Pakistan’s terrorism problem is a layered phenomenon and may not be as sequential as explained above, with its different forms coexisting, such as the TTP (Islamist ) militancy in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa; insurgency in Balochistan; and sectarian violence. Thus, terrorism in Pakistan represents the interplay of ideology, identity and geopolitics, where the geopolitics continues to exploit internal weaknesses.
Many studies describe terrorism as a reaction to marginalisation, injustice or political exclusion. This simplistic perspective views terrorism as a response to specific grievances, without fully exhausting the subtleties of contemporary security landscape. Assuming that terrorism is simply a by-product of one particular problem, the solution to the problem should therefore translate into the elimination of terrorism. But historical and current evidence suggest otherwise. Despite the reduction of some of the grievances, either new grounds of discontent are created, or power struggles and ideological ambition keep generating incentives for violent action.
Pakistan’s terrorism problem should not be viewed in terms of institutional weaknesses or domestic grievances alone, but also in the context of regional and geopolitical interventions. Beyond the internal fault lines, external actors, proxies and cross-border networks heavily influence militant violence in Pakistan, limiting state capacity to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. In this context, counterterrorism does not exist as an internal security issue alone but also manifests as an issue of foreign policy orientation.
The persistent tensions with India and Afghanistan complicate Pakistan’s efforts towards building stability and deepening intraregional and interregional engagement. Moreover, the securitisation of development projects and attacks on Chinese nationals and infrastructure complicate the relationship between Pakistan and China. These challenges underscore that Pakistan’s terrorism strategy should not merely rest on domestic reforms but also on a strategically equal foreign policy that will be able to counteract externalities and bring down the scale of proxy-led warfare.
Hence, the idea of ‘finishing’ or ‘eradicating’ terrorism through one reform or solving one grievance is flawed. The multifaceted and multilayered nature of terrorism renders any single route completely ineffective. It is neither through pure kinetic nor non-kinetic measures, but a multipronged strategic approach that the threat of terrorism can be managed.
First, long-term socio-economic growth is needed to decrease horizontal disparities and curb identity-based grievances that have been historically critical in inspiring separatist movements, specifically in Balochistan. Counterterrorism initiatives will lack if they are focused on treating the symptoms and not the root causes of violence by reducing structural inequities in political representation, resources distribution and social inclusion.
Second, Pakistan needs to redefine its regional attitude towards Afghanistan and India in order to reduce the geopolitical drivers of militancy because cross-border interactions and unresolved rivalries have been repeatedly used to render ideological legitimacy and room to armed forces.
Last, structural reforms in Pakistan’s security architecture are obligatory. The reformation of the Counter Terrorism Departments and the revival of the National Action Plan is needed to align state institutions and mechanisms better to the changing character of terrorism, which today comprises the ideological, ethnic and geopolitical aspects.
It is only through the incorporation of the socio-economic inclusion, regional diplomacy and institutional reform that Pakistan can shift to active counterterrorism to sustainable stability.
