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The writer is a public policy analyst based in Lahore. She can be reached at durdananajam1@gmail.com
When the simmering conflict between the US-Israel duo and Iran erupted into a full?blown crisis, one unexpected shift was quietly taking shape: Pakistan was emerging as a potential go-between in efforts to dial down tensions. Islamabad’s outreach to both Washington and Tehran — including contacts between Pakistan Prime Minister and American officials — suggests Pakistan may host or help facilitate talks aimed at ending the conflict and closing a dangerous regional chapter.
This is not just another headline. It is a strategic setback for New Delhi, and a reminder that influence in international diplomacy is earned in moments of crisis, not claimed through rhetoric or public posturing.
For more than a decade, the Modi government in India has pushed a narrative of strength: isolating Pakistan and projecting itself as an indispensable power in West Asia. But when the region needed real diplomatic initiative, Delhi failed to translate that narrative into action. Instead it was Pakistan, often dismissed in Indian policy circles, that found itself in the room where it matters.
There are several reasons for this. One, Islamabad’s balanced engagement, sustaining workable ties with both Tehran and Riyadh, while maintaining dialogue with Washington. Two, Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and has historical links that go beyond transactional diplomacy. Three, Tehran, for its part, has not rejected Pakistan’s overtures even as distrust of US?Israeli actions runs deep.
Contrast this with India’s position: Delhi claims strong relations with Tehran but has been conspicuously absent from efforts to de?escalate. Adding to this perception is India’s reluctance to condemn acts widely viewed in the region as provocative. When civilian infrastructure was hit in Tehran, and grieving families cried out against what they saw as unjustified violence, the Indian state’s silence was interpreted as alignment with the aggressors. For many in India too, this was unacceptable — a distortive choice that ignored widespread public empathy with Iran.
This disconnect is more than political theatre. It has real diplomatic consequences. Modi’s highly publicised visit to Israel on the eve of the Iran war was widely interpreted, both in Tehran and across the region, as signalling India’s alignment with Tel Aviv rather than neutrality. Coupled with persistent allegations, circulated in multiple quarters, about Indian intelligence cooperation with Mossad, these developments have hurt India’s credibility as a possible mediator.
By contrast, Pakistan’s diplomacy has been measured. Islamabad’s military and civilian leaders have held talks with US counterparts, offered to host peace negotiations and maintained open channels with Iranian officials. Reports suggest that Egypt, Türkiye and Pakistan are relaying messages between Washington and Tehran in efforts to contain the crisis — a role India hoped to play but did not.
This isn’t Pakistan claiming global leadership, nor is it a dramatic reversal of history. It is practical diplomacy in action. Pakistan also has motivation rooted in national interest: the Iran?US clash has disrupted energy supplies and trade routes, hit global oil prices and intensified domestic economic pressure. Ensuring stability in the Gulf isn’t an academic exercise for Islamabad; it is a pressing economic necessity.
For New Delhi, the fallout is stark. India’s foreign policy has leaned heavily on big-ticket alliances and optics — summits, strategic partnerships, ceremonial handshakes — while at the same time failing to build the deeper, trust-based relationships that matter in moments of crisis. Wealth, population size or military muscle can impress in peace-time press releases. But when war looms and difficult conversations are needed, what counts is credibility.
Pakistan’s diplomatic insertion does not mean it has solved the crisis. Iran remains sceptical of direct negotiations with the United States, demanding substantial concessions before talks can proceed. But Islamabad’s willingness to step into the fray and offer a venue in Islamabad, to hold shuttle diplomacy, to engage on behalf of all parties, stands in stark contrast to New Delhi’s hesitancy.
India, by contrast, finds itself constrained by a foreign policy that has prioritised alignment with powerful allies over regional trust, overlooked public sentiment at home and misunderstood the nuances of West Asian politics. If Delhi truly wishes to be taken seriously as a strategic player, it must recalibrate its approach. That means investing in genuine dialogue with Tehran beyond sanctions calculus; addressing public scepticism within India instead of ignoring it; and rebalancing partnerships so that India is seen as a partner to all, not a partner only to the powerful.
In a region where influence is earned through sustained, credible engagement and not just optics, Pakistan’s emergence is a signal, not an anomaly. For New Delhi, the choice is clear: adapt to the real dynamics of regional diplomacy, or remain on the sidelines as others shape the outcomes it once aspired to lead.
