Every now and then an embarrassed Indian politico-military leadership hurls threats against Pakistan. From continuation of Operation Sindoor, to erasing Pakistan from the map, to Sindoor being a trailer of what is to come, to comments on Sindh – the diatribes are so endless that nobody takes them seriously anymore. The familiar pattern is to whip up anti-Pakistan xenophobia to gain political mileage before any crucial elections in India.
The 'strongman' Modi, in an attempt to salvage his losing standing and to burnish his tough credentials in leading his 'rising India', every now and then resorts to limited conventional war with Pakistan under the presumed pretext of terrorism. And this all too familiar pattern is likely to continue whenever the international and regional environment is conducive to such political junkets and military gimmicks.
Frustrated by acts of terrorism on its soil due to security failures, Modi would blame Pakistan without any rhyme or reason, and the war hysteria would be trumped up by an irresponsible, fake and jingoistic Bharati media, which would escalate the situation to an extent where Indian leadership would rapidly climb the mainly 'psychological' escalation ladder. From such high perch on the escalation ladder, it would then be embarrassing to climb down without losing face.
Hence 'teaching Islamabad' a lesson would result into military gambits with dubious aims, to deescalate and justify the rhetorical and rapid escalation. And the ensuing military action would break down the 'conventional deterrence' between both militaries. And that is where the real danger lies.
I have extensively written about the jingoistic mindset within Indian miltablishment which thinks: a) there is space for a limited conventional and punitive war against Pakistan despite the nuclear overhang; b) that nuclear parity and conventional deterrence would not escalate the war into the nuclear domain; and c) if the situation escalates into the unthinkable, Pakistan does not have the resolve to use its non-conventional means i.e. the nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the medal-hungry Indian military establishment in their efforts to retrieve some lost sindoor, keeps cajoling and persuading their political masters to call 'Pakistan's nuclear bluff', and get rid of Islamabad's 'nuclear blackmail' once and for all. This is India's presumed geo-military construct.
From Pakistan's standpoint, the thinking is that the conventional parity would be able to deal with the Indian aggression befittingly. And that the breakdown of 'conventional deterrence' would not necessarily transcend into non-conventional (read nuclear) war. Balakot and Bunyan-Un-Marsoos are cases in point.
However, these two short skirmishes are not very apt unfolding of the Indian threat and should, therefore, not be taken as response metrices if the war prolongs or gets into a bi or tri-service modes. Pakistan's linear geography, logistic stamina and sensitivity to losses in men, material, economy, territory and population would rapidly and dangerously, if understandably, escalate into the non-conventional realm.
There would be immense pressure on the civil and military leadership in Pakistan to respond to Indian air, ground or seaborne blitz with equal intensity, whatever the cost. Reaching the threshold between non-nuclear and nuclear war, in case of Pakistan, would be much faster than India and that is what the Indian miltablishment fails to comprehend or denies understanding.
And this debunks the Indian myth of having space for a nuclear war in South Asia despite the nuclearisation of both India and Pakistan. Any longer war between these two militaries with demonstrated usage of military means would one hundred per cent become a nuclear exchange. Indian General Staff should have no doubts about it. The reason Pakistan beefs up its conventional deterrence is to obviate such nuclear exchange or delay it as much as possible.
Pakistan's leadership dilemma is either to face geo-economic and military degradation in a longer conflict where India – which has hitherto not hesitated to use ballistic and cruise missiles, armed drones and air force all over Pakistan as seen in May this year – or respond with punitive 'escalation' into the non-nuclear realm quickly to force interlocution by international stakeholders and inject some sanity in the Indian warriors nurtured on the fables of Maha Bharat.
The third issue of 'resolve to use all means including nuclear weapons' to defend against a bellicose India, bent upon destructive aggression, is also a fallacy of the Indian miltablishment. A recent rebuttal by ISPR points to the fact that Sindoor 2.0 or its avatars would result into destroying the myth of Indian geographic impunity. The response by Islamabad's civil and military leadership, who did not blink under relatively more adverse environment than today, would be punishing, measuredly disproportionate and very swift. The General Staff in New Delhi and their political masters should have no doubts on this account too.
To further reinforce conventional deterrence, Pakistan needs hardening of its assets, a robust air defence, counterespionage to neutralise the Indo-Israeli-Afghan nexus, drone swarms and more investment in its missiles' speed, reach, lethality and accuracy. Pakistan also needs to 'further' strengthen its nuclear triad. Pakistan 'may' face the first nuclear shot, but it will not allow India to fire the second shot. Recent reorganisations of Pakistan's strategic forces and relevant command-and-control arrangements are steps in the right direction.
But more than anything else, Pakistan needs to announce its nuclear policy, that of responding to unprovoked aggression by India using all means. Thankfully, Pakistan's nuclear capability is more robust with comparatively better, smarter warheads and numbers, effective miniaturisation, fail-safe command and control systems, robust delivery means and a resolve spanning Pakistan's indomitable will to fight.
Against these perilous odds, India may do well to engage bilaterally with Pakistan to discuss all issues including Kashmir; enhance trade and commerce; avoid water wars and proxies in Afghanistan; and live up to its size and its jealously guarded 'self-importance'. South Asia deserves peace, and peace for its dense humanity depends upon India, more than it does on Pakistan. Peaceful rise like China demonstrated with its harmony will do greater good to India's still struggling and dirt-poor humanity.
Peace in its immediate and larger neighbourhood will benefit New Delhi, else the ever-present danger of a nuclear conflict entailing assured destruction will always drag it down.
