Ports, not warships

Nobody is constructing bases anymore. They are constructing “logistics facilities”.

The language is different and so is the strategy. The hard fortresses and open military bases are not only expensive politically, but also provocative to diplomacy in the twenty-first century Indian Ocean. In their place has come something less visible yet equally strategic – access agreements, replenishment hubs and dual use ports. The Indian Ocean is increasingly turning into a web of networked logistical nodes that merge commerce and coercion.

Consider the support base of China in Djibouti. It was the first overseas military facility of Beijing that was formally explained as a logistics base to assist in anti-piracy operations and UN peacekeeping missions. Its position close to Bab el-Mandeb Strait provides China with strategic access to West Asia and East Africa. The facility aids in naval replenishment, intelligence collection and possible projection of power. But it is coexisting with commercial port investment, which contributes to the dual-use ambiguity of this age.

As India has long feared being surrounded in its maritime neighbourhood, it has reacted with its own logistic web. Its accord with Oman that allows it to access the Duqm Port gives the Indian Navy repair and replenishment facilities that are strategically located outside the Strait of Hormuz. New Delhi is also developing strategic depth without the semblance of militarisation through similar deals with island states and regional partners. Logistics, in this case, is deterrence by presence.

The United States, being viewed as the classical maritime hegemon in the Indian Ocean, introduced this model several decades ago, when it established the long-term military presence on Diego Garcia. The recent tensions surrounding Iran also show how this logistics web actually works in practice. Now instead of building new bases, Washington is using an existing network: Diego Garcia to Naval Support Activity Bahrain, to bring online previously established infrastructure which turns peacetime access into crisis advantage. It is not the power of new construction, but the power of operationalising what exists.

Japan too has joined this silent competition. It has its Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) stationed in Djibouti, supposedly on counter-piracy operations. However, the infrastructure gives Tokyo operational capability well beyond its home waters – a sign of Japan slowly becoming a security actor. Once again, it is the language of logistics. Reality is maintained being.

All these cases are held together not through aggressive expansionism but strategic layering. Naval visits are made in commercial ports. Anti-piracy operations are justification of infrastructure improvements. Long deployments are made possible by maintenance hubs. The outcome is a thick web of dual-use spaces in which warships are docked with container vessels and supply chains collide with security chains. There is deliberate blurring of military and commercial lines. It is no Cold War-style base building. It is a logistics web strategy in which we do not see an open arms race but rather accumulation of access.

To the smaller states in the Indian Ocean, this is an opportunity and a threat. Investment in infrastructure augments development and trade. However, dual-use facilities may drag them into the geopolitical rivalry, reducing ports to pressure points where logistics has become the new grammar of power. Warships continue to sail but their efficiency relies on fuel, repair, intelligence and access. Survival is more of a necessity than a symbol in a huge sea that starts at the Strait of Hormuz and goes on to the Strait of Malacca.

The future of the Indian Ocean will not be determined by the number of bases constructed. It will depend on who spins the strongest logistics web. Ports, not warships, are the real tools of power in this silent rivalry.